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Major changes in the age patterns of fertility were characteristic of fertility
trends following the Second World War. The paper provides an overview and
analysis of changes in age patterns of cohort childbearing in low-fertility
countries during the second half of the 20
th century. In Western countries
cohorts born around 1940 had earlier childbearing than those of 1930. Early
childbearing persisted among cohorts born during the 1940s, although
generally at a lower level. Major shifts occurred among the cohorts born
during the 1950s. These women incurred considerable fertility deficits when
young and compensated, at least in part if not totally, with surpluses when
they reached their upper twenties and thirties. Many of the postponed births
were made up. The decline in fertility among young women continues in the
cohorts born during the 1960s and 1970s. In the formerly socialist countries
the fertility decline among young women commenced with those born in the
late 1950s and is continuing among those born in the 1960s and 1970s. In
almost all low-fertility countries each cohort of young women born in the
1960s and 1970s is having fewer children than preceding ones. It appears
unrealistic to expect that these cohorts will eventually attain replacement
levels because of the considerable deficits incurred when young.  Their fertility
when older would have to be extraordinarily high even to realize completed
fertility of the cohorts born around 1960, which on average was below
replacement. A postponement of births regarded as temporary by the couples
involved with many of the postponed births never being born, as well as
conscious decisions to have fewer births than previous cohorts, appear to be
continuing processes in most countries.2
Introduction
The 20
th century is distinguished by larger changes in fertility behavior
than humanity has ever experienced (Calot 1999; Chesnais 1992; Landry
1933, 1934; Notestein 1945).
 Towards the end of the 19
th century and during the first three decades
of the 20
th, in one industrializing country after another, fertility declined
precipitously. So much so that within intervals of a few decades total period
fertility rates (TPFRs) descended from the order of about 5 to around 2
children per woman. Given the level of mortality in the 1920s and 1930s in
Europe, more than half of its population was reproducing at below
replacement (Kirk 1946). Following the Second World War (WW2), many of
these countries experienced a significant rise in fertility, generally known as
the  “baby boom.” The formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe did not experience this baby boom and fertility started a considerable
descent to around replacement within a few years after WW2. In the
remainder of Europe and in overseas English speaking developed countries
considerable fertility declines took place starting in the 1960s. Even sharper
fertility declines, essentially from “traditional” levels, occurred in a number of
large and small populations in East Asia also since the 1960s. By the late
1990s all of these countries reached unprecedented low period fertility; all of
them below replacement and almost half of them below a TPFR of 1.5
children per woman (Frejka, Ross forthcoming).
Taking the cohort perspective, Frejka and Calot (2001) showed that in
the low-fertility countries generations, which started their childbearing after
WW2 and ended it in the 1970s, had an average total cohort fertility rate
(TCFR) decidedly above replacement at 2.5 children per woman. Those that
ended childbearing during the 1990s had an average TCFR of replacement at
2.1, and robust estimates indicate that those who will conclude their
childbearing around 2010 will have an average TCFR of 1.9 children per
woman. Furthermore, the fertility trends of cohorts that are in the middle of --
or initiating -- their childbearing indicate a tendency for further decrease. Will
the analysis of changes in age patterns of childbearing confirm or refute this
conclusion?
As will become evident, major changes in the age patterns of fertility
were an inherent part of the fertility trends following WW2. The objective of
this paper is to provide an overview and analysis of changes in age patterns
of cohort childbearing in low-fertility countries during the second half of the
20
th century. The paper is part of an extensive project exploring in detail
cohort fertility behavior in approximately 30 populations of Europe, North
America, Oceania and East Asia
1.
                                                          
1 The working title of the project is “Contemporary cohort reproductive patterns: Low fertility
countries in the second half of the 20
th and in the early 21
st century.” In the paper “Cohort Reproductive
Patterns in Low-Fertility Countries” (Population and Development Review 27:1, 103-132, March
2001) the methodology is described, a general analysis as well as an analysis of a small number of
reasonably representative countries is conducted, and a series of conclusions is presented. The focus on3
The general fertility decline of the last several decades of the 20
th
century in the low-fertility countries has been a complex process. A number of
scholars have and are exploring the demographic complexities (for instance,
Bongaarts, Feeney 1998;  Kohler, Ortega 2001) and others have and are
investigating the societal circumstances that brought about this decline (for
instance, Kirk 1996; Macura 2000; van de Kaa 1987). The analysis in this
paper falls into the former category.
The strength of the paper is that it provides an overview of the most
important features of the subject matter utilizing data for 30 countries. It has,
however, a number of limitations. Because the paper provides an overview it
cannot capture various subtleties and it presents the overall picture in broad
strokes.  Given the restrictions on its size, it cannot cover crucial structural
details, such as a breakdown of changes in the age patterns of individual
parities, or related issues, such as changes in parity progression ratios, parity
distributions and childlessness. Work on these issues is in progress and will
be reported on in other papers.
Basic changes of cohort age patterns of fertility in the second half of the
20
th century
We start with the example of one country to illustrate typical changes of
the age structure. In Denmark the TCFRs of the 1930-31 and the 1940-41
cohorts were quite similar, 2.37 and 2.22, respectively, yet their age patterns
of fertility were remarkably different (see Figure 1a). Compared to the 1930-31
cohort, women of the 1940-41 cohort were having more children when they
were young, and once they reached age 27, they were having fewer children
than the cohort born 10 years earlier. Childbearing shifted into the younger
ages.
Among the cohorts born during the decade of the 1940s, completed
cohort fertility declined from 2.22 to 1.90 which was also accompanied by a
change in the age pattern. At the youngest and oldest ages fertility remained
fairly constant, but there was a substantial drop when women were in their
20s.
Subsequently, among the cohorts born during the 1950s, TCFRs
remained unchanged at 1.90 children per woman, however, the age pattern
changed considerably. Compared to the cohort of 1950-51, those of the 1960-
61 cohort were having fewer children as teenagers and in their early twenties,
but once they reached their late twenties, they had many more children (see
Figure 1a). Fertility shifted significantly into the older ages. In graphical terms,
the fertility curve of age-specific rates and of cumulated cohort rates shifted to
the right in Figure 1a as well as in Figure 1b.
                                                                                                                                                                     
cohort fertility represents an effort to complement other research and by no means implies that cohort
analysis is superior to period analysis.4
A methodological note: the dividing point between young and older
women
As shown in Figure 1, the crossover from relatively high fertility in the
older ages in the 1930-31 cohort to relatively higher fertility among young
women in the 1940-41 cohort occurred in Denmark between ages 25 and 26.
Subsequently, the crossover from relatively high fertility at young ages in the
1950-51 cohort to relatively high fertility at the older ages in the 1960-61
cohort took place between the ages of 26 and 27. Similar crossovers occurred
at much the same ages in most “Western” countries
2. That was the first
substantive reason why completed age 26 was chosen as the divider between
fertility at young and older ages for the age structural analysis in the
remainder of this paper. Furthermore, almost invariably among cohorts born
during the 1950s and 1960s in the Western countries fertility was lower than
in previously born cohorts up to about age 26 or 27, which tended to be the
turning point from whence fertility was higher than in previous cohorts (see
Frejka, Calot 2001, Figures 4 and 13).
Another reason for selecting completed age 26 as a divider is purely
formal. Completed age 26 is half way between the ages of 15 and 40, the
latter having been the effective age of completed childbearing in the countries
of our concern during the second half of the 20
th century.
Last but not least, at the time when our explorations started, the
childbearing age patterns for the 1970 cohorts in most countries were
available up to completed age 26. These cohorts will be the subject of
analysis later in the paper.
Shift of fertility between the young and the older ages
The changes described above for Denmark when expressed as
changes in the proportion of total cohort fertility that occurs before completed
age 26, irrespective of the absolute value of the TCFR, provide the following
picture. In the 1930-31 birth cohort 56 percent of fertility was realized when
this cohort was young, i.e. by completed age 26 (see Table 1). The cohorts
born during the late 1930s and early 1940s -- represented by the 1940-41
birth cohort – advanced their childbearing even more than previous cohorts
and thus contributed to the tail-end of the baby boom. Not only did these
cohorts have relatively high fertility, they also had a comparatively large
proportion of their children early, 65 percent before age 27.
Even though one cohort after another of those born during the 1940s
had lower total fertility than the previous one, the pattern of early childbearing
persisted. The 1950-51 birth cohort still had 60 percent of its children in their
teens and early to mid-twenties. Subsequently, while TCFRs remained stable
                                                          
2 The principal exceptions were three of the four countries of Southern Europe: Greece, Portugal and
Spain. In Greece and Spain we lack data for the cohorts born in the 1930s and 1940s. Taking the
known data, the trends of total cohort fertility and of the childbearing age patterns were different from
the other Western countries.5
at about 1.90 among the cohorts born during the 1950s and early 1960s, a
continuously smaller proportion of children were borne by young women; in
the 1960-61 cohort only 40 percent.
Similar changes occurred in most Western countries, although at
somewhat different levels (see Table 1). In the Netherlands the proportions of
children borne by young women were relatively small for all cohorts
concerned, their childbearing was relatively late in the reproductive period. In
contrast, in the United States women tended to bear children early. But the
differences between successive cohorts were similar from country to country.
In Southern Europe, with the exception of Italy, the trends of the
TCFRs as well as the childbearing age patterns differed from the other
Western countries. As far as is known and can be implied, the decline of
TCFRs started with cohorts born around 1940, i. e. with cohorts born later
than in the other Western countries (see Frejka, Calot 2001). The trends of
the TCFR decline were steeper and the changes of the childbearing age
patterns were predominantly fertility declines of older women not only among
the cohorts of the 1930s, but also the ones of the 1940s.
The levels and nature of the changes were quite different in the
formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the formerly
socialist Baltic countries. Already among the cohorts born around 1930
childbearing was early. The proportions of children born to these cohorts
before age 27 were about 60 percent and larger. For the subsequent cohorts
the proportions of early childbearing continued to increase. In the cohorts born
around 1960 in most of these countries the proportion of children born before
age 27 were 70 percent or higher.
The changes in the childbearing age patterns were somewhat unique
in Japan. Essentially TCFRs and the age distribution of childbearing were
level from the cohorts born around 1930 to those born in the mid-1950s. At
least part of the reason was that Japan did not experience a post-WW2 baby
boom. Among the cohorts born since the mid-1950s there has been a TCFR
descent. As in the Western countries this has been accompanied by a decline
in the proportion of childbearing in the young ages.
In the next section the trends indicated in the last column of Table 1 will
be analyzed. In principal, these consist of a shift in the proportion of total
cohort fertility from the young to the older ages in the Western countries and a
mild further increase in the proportion of the younger population in the
formerly socialist countries among the cohorts of the 1950s. In particular,
trends of the magnitudes of childbearing in the young and in the older age
groups will be analyzed, as these are not directly evident from changes in the
proportions.
A second methodological note: postponement
Many authors have referred to the shift of births (or childbearing) from
lower to higher ages as postponement of births (or childbearing). The term6
“postponement” means that what is being postponed will take place in the
future. That is inherent in the definition Hajnal (1947: 151) introduced, namely
“[B]y 'postponement' of childbearing I mean a fall in fertility rates balanced by
a subsequent rise so that the size of the family remains relatively constant.”
This can be considered a formal demography definition. In reality frequently
there is not a good match between the fall and the subsequent rise of fertility.
The latter can be smaller or larger than the earlier fertility decline. Hajnal
leaves some leeway in his formulation: “  …so that the size of the family
remains relatively constant” (emphasis added). Should the profession use the
term “postponement” even when the subsequent rise is far smaller or larger
than the initial fall in fertility rates?
The issue gets further complicated when individual subjective decision-
making is taken into consideration. In a paper reporting on fertility
expectations in the United States in the early 1960s, Freedman and Bumpass
(1966: 189) say:  “ … the recently lower birth rates of the younger groups
were mainly due to a postponement of births regarded as temporary by the
couples involved, although it may turn out to have been permanent or at least
to have involved fewer births than expected” (emphasis added). This is a
“social demography” use of the concept.
An additional issue is measurement, mainly the selection of the base
against which the change is measured. In this paper periods 5 or 10 years
apart are used.
An even more complex issue is when cohorts that are at the beginning
or in the middle of their childbearing periods and they have lower fertility than
previous ones. Are these cohorts postponing their childbearing? In-depth
sociological knowledge, for instance, may inform about whether the process is
perceived by the majority of the couples involved as birth postponement or as
clear decisions to have less or even no children.
At times authors use the concept without specifying what is really
meant.
In this paper whenever the concept “postponement of births” is used,
its meaning is clearly stated in line with the above definitions.
Were women born during the 1950s postponing their births?
When comparing the 1950 birth cohorts with those of 1960, as a rule to
which there were very few exceptions, fertility declined among women below
age 27 in the Western countries, in Southern Europe and in the formerly
socialist countries. In the 1950 birth cohorts by completed age 26 on average
women had borne at least around 1 child and up to as many as 1.7 children
(see Table 2). In the 1960 birth cohort in practically all Western countries on
average women had borne considerably less than one child by age 27.
Fertility of young women had also declined considerably in Italy and Spain,7
Australia and New Zealand, as well as in Japan. Smaller declines had taken
place in the US, Portugal and Greece, and in the formerly socialist countries.
In Table 2 the differences in the values of fertility rates experienced by
young women (before they reached age 27) between the 1950 and the 1960
cohorts are compared with the differences in fertility rates when these women
were older (after their age of 26). This illustrates the extent to which the 1960
cohort compensated in the second part of its reproductive period the fertility
deficit incurred when these women were young (see Table 2).
In all the countries of Northern Europe as well as in Belgium, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the US when in their late 20s and in their
30s women actually bore all the children they did not have when they were
young. In Finland they even overcompensated. In quite a number of the
Western countries only a fraction of the lower fertility of the 1960 cohort was
realized when women were in the second part of their reproductive period.
In most of the countries of Southern Europe as well as in the formerly
socialist countries fertility was lower throughout the reproductive life of the
1960 cohort compared to the 1950 one. In Eastern Germany and in Russia
the 1960 cohort had elevated fertility when young and relatively low fertility
later in life.
Then there was the case of Hungary where the 1960 cohort had only
slightly lower fertility below age 27 and therefore the somewhat elevated
fertility after age 26 appeared as a more than four-fold, large
overcompensation.
In terms of “postponement of births” it is justified to consider the 1960
cohorts in the Nordic countries, Belgium and the US as having done so when
young and made up the postponed births when older. These cohorts did so in
the formal demographic and the social demographic sense. In the remainder
of the Western countries if at a young age much of the low fertility was an
expression of the subjective intention of postponing births, only a fraction of
them were actually born. The intention was not realized. In these countries a
proportion of women or couples were postponing some births in the social
demographic sense.
The 1960 cohorts in the Central and East European countries had
borne most of their children before the collapse of the socialist political and
economic system around 1990. The relatively fertility stabilizing effect of the
system was apparent in that there were minor declines, which might have
been postponements perceived as such by the young women, but no making
up took place when they were older.
In the next sections the above analysis will be utilized to provide some
insights on the fertility behavior in general, and the age patterns thereof,
among cohorts that in the 1990s were in the middle or at the beginning of their
childbearing periods.8
A third methodological note: structural changes
In the strict sense of the concept “structural changes,” one can observe
and analyze these if the whole of any entity and the values of its individual
components are known. With regard to the cohorts starting with those born
around 1930 to the ones of around 1960, that is much of what has been done
in this paper so far.
We now turn to the information about the childbearing age patterns of
women who -- in the mid- to late 1990s -- were in the middle of their
reproductive period. Generally, these had completed age 26. This means that
only a part of their eventual completed fertility was known, yet it is our desire
to utilize this knowledge and evaluate their childbearing trajectory to date.
This can be done by conducting a preliminary exploration of what can happen,
what might occur or what is unlikely to occur during the remainder of their
reproductive life span, i.e. by the time they will have effectively concluded
their childbearing.
One way to proceed is to set target total cohort fertility rates and to
evaluate or to engage in educated speculations on whether the implied age
fertility patterns after age 26 needed to attain the stipulated targets are
realistic.
What is known about future cohort age trajectories?
A. Fertility patterns of young women in cohorts midway in their
childbearing in the mid-1990s
A considerable decline in cumulated cohort fertility by age 27 has been
the rule in almost all the countries of the sample comparing the 1970 with the
1960 cohorts (see Table 3). There were two exceptions: A distinct one, the
United States, and another, weaker one, New Zealand.
In the “Western” countries, the fertility decline of the young cohorts
born during the 1960s was a continuation of the descent among the cohorts
born during the 1950s. On average, in the 18 “Western” countries the level of
fertility of the young fell by almost 50 percent within the span of the 20 cohorts
born between 1950 and 1970. The decline was particularly large in Italy,
Spain and the Netherlands. In these countries only about 0.3 of a child was
born per woman by the time the women in the 1970 cohort reached age 27;
down from 0.9, 1.0 and 1.1 in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, respectively
(see Table 3).
Comparing the cohorts born in 1970 to those born in 1960 in the
formerly socialist countries the descent was of a similar order of magnitude as
in the Western countries. Despite this large drop, their fertility while young is
still at a high level, because these countries previously had a pattern of very
young childbearing. In almost all the formerly socialist countries, young
women of the 1970 cohort were still having approximately one child by the9
time they reached age 27 and their childbearing peak continues to be in the
early twenties.
B. Estimated future fertility patterns of older women in cohorts midway
in their childbearing in the mid-1990s
Since the childbearing patterns of the 1970 birth cohorts in the
countries of the sample were known up to completed age 26 (in exceptional
cases 27 or 28), alternative target total cohort fertility rates could be
stipulated, and characteristics of fertility patterns after age 26 could be
estimated on this basis.
Two such general target TCFRs were selected: the TCFR of 1960 in
the respective country, and the TCFR of replacement defined as 2.1 children
per woman.
Taking the example of Denmark:
1. The children per woman that were already born by age 27 to the
1970-71 cohort represent 32 percent of the target TCFR of the 1960-61
cohort.
2. If the 1970-71 cohort were eventually to attain the same TCFR as
that of the 1960-61 cohort, another 68 percent still remain to be born (see
Table 4).
3. For the 1970-71 cohort to attain fertility of replacement (= 2.1),
another 71 percent of children of that cohort would have to be born (see Table
4).
4. These resulting values of 68 and 71 percent are subsequently
compared with the proportion of childbearing that was realized after age 26 in
the 1960-61 cohort. By doing so, the relative magnitude or difference between
the amount of children that “need to be born” to achieve the target TCFRs and
the actual amount of children that were borne by the 1960-61 cohorts is
demonstrated (see last two columns of Table 4). Fertility of the 1970-71
cohort would have to increase by 14 percent for the TCFR of the 1960-61
cohort to be attained, and by 19 percent to attain replacement.
A rough evaluation
The results of the calculations show that in practically every country the
proportion or amount of childbearing needed to attain the stipulated targets for
the 1970-71 birth cohorts are larger, in many cases formidably so, than the
respective amounts in the 1960-61 cohorts (see Table 4).
In order to be able to appraise this information, a criterion has to be
defined so that relevant precise-quantitative or vague-qualitative evaluations10
can be made. Given the relatively general level of analysis in this paper it
appears difficult to devise the former. For the latter it is proposed to inquire
whether it appears likely or unlikely for fertility to increase as much as
indicated by the numbers in Table 4 among the cohorts under consideration
when they will be in their late twenties and in their thirties.
As a first approximation one can say that as long as the values in the
last two columns of Table 4 are relatively small, for instance, less than a 30
percent growth, it might be possible to achieve such an increase of
childbearing after age 26. Obviously, the larger the number the less likely
such a development.
One can also examine the values of the “proportions of childbearing
needed after completed age 26 in the 1970-71 cohort to attain either the
TCFR of 1960-61, or of replacement” (the third and fourth column from the
right hand side in Table 4). If such values have been experienced in other
countries before, they can be considered attainable.
This procedure does not lead to very satisfactory results and is blurry.
A more detailed evaluation
Taking the example of Denmark, instead of merely considering the
overall ratio of needed increase, age-specific curves are plotted which
illustrate scenarios of augmented fertility rates that would be needed to reach
the desired elevated fertility after age 26. A visual inspection of Figure 2a
illustrates that it would be rather unlikely for Danish women born in 1970-71 to
decide to have so many children in their late twenties and early thirties that
would result in the TCFR of the 1960-61 cohort, or even less so a TCFR of
replacement.
It is not totally out of the realm of the possible for the 1970-71 cohort to
reach the target TCFRs. If, for instance, the elevated curves after age 26 are
compared with the real cohort fertility age trajectory of Swiss women born in
1930
3 who achieved a TCFR of 2.18 (see Figure 2b), a reasonable similarity
of the Danish and Swiss curves can be observed. Detailed calculations show
that age-specific fertility rates needed to attain the TCFR of the 1960-61
cohort are consistently lower than those of the 1930 Swiss cohort. To attain
cohort replacement would obviously be more difficult. Up to age 38 the
estimated Danish age-specific fertility rates are higher than those of the 1930
cohort of Swiss women.
Data in Table 4 show that Bulgarian women born in 1970-71 would
have to have more than twice as many children after age 26 than the women
of the 1960-61 cohort. At first sight that appears implausible. An examination
                                                          
3 The 1930 Swiss birth cohort was selected for comparison because it represented a real age pattern of
late cohort fertility of the recent past with a TCFR around replacement. A 1960 cohort would have
been preferable but any that had a sufficiently high TCFR had age patterns almost identical to
Denmark’s.11
of Figure 3a illustrates scenarios of age-specific fertility behavior that would
be needed to attain the TCFRs of the 1960-61 cohort or the TCFR of
replacement. The peak of childbearing in Bulgaria for the 1970-71 birth cohort
was at age 20. By completed age 26 the majority of Bulgarian women of that
cohort will have completed their childbearing. Among the cohort of 1960-61 it
was 81 percent (see Table 1). In their late twenties women of the 1970-71
cohort would have to have age-specific fertility rates about as high as they
had in their early twenties to attain the TCFR of the 1960-61 cohort. Such a
drastic reversal of the fertility age pattern is not likely to occur. This reflection
leads to a conclusion that a major proportion of childbearing of the 1970-71
cohort has already occurred before age 27. It is unrealistic to expect that this
cohort will reach either of the target cohort fertility rates.
Interesting reflections are generated by superimposing the age fertility
trajectory of the Swiss 1930 birth cohort. The difference between childbearing
patterns of European countries stand out. The cohorts born around 1970 in
the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe still had a very
young age pattern of fertility. These were cohorts which started their
childbearing approximately five years before the collapse of the authoritarian
systems in those countries. It is conceivable that the cohorts born more
recently will adopt childbearing age patterns more similar to those of the
Western countries.
What do the childbearing age patterns of the youngest cohorts indicate?
The cumulated cohort fertility rates (CCFRs) up to completed age 21
have been on the decline in practically all the Western countries for 25 recent
birth cohorts, starting with those born in 1950-51 through those born in 1975-
76 (see Table 5). The overall decline has been between 60 and 80 percent in
the majority of these countries (not shown separately in Table 5). The decline
has been continuing among the youngest cohorts, namely those born during
the 1970s. In some countries this descent has been faster than among the
older cohorts and in others slower. In the 1975-76 cohorts the absolute levels
of this fertility are, as a rule, very low, namely below 0.2 children per woman.
The outstanding exception is the United States, with a relatively stable CCFR
over the 25 cohorts of about 0.5 children per woman.
Note that there are signs of the fertility decline among young women in
some countries coming to an end. In West Germany, the 1975-76 cohort even
had a fertility rate higher than that of the 1970-71 cohort.
In the formerly socialist countries the trends as well as the absolute
levels were different. In many of them, the 1960-61 cohort had higher CCFRs
up to completed age 21 than the 1950-51 cohort. Subsequently, a decline
began in practically all of these countries since the cohort of 1960-61, which
accelerated between the cohorts born in 1970-71 and 1975-76 (see Table 5).
The level of fertility by completed age 21 in the 1975-76 cohorts in practically
all the formerly socialist countries was still generally about twice as high as in
the Western countries.12
The general CCFR trend throughout the low fertility countries among
the cohorts born in the 1970s was a continuing decline. What does this imply?
Was the postponement of births an inherent element of childbearing age
trajectories in the late 20
th century?
A. A recapitulation of what can be stated with certainty
1. Comparing fertility of young with that of older women
4 of the 1960
contrasted with the 1950 cohorts, there were a number of countries in which
the deficits incurred when young, were compensated or even over-
compensated, when these women were older (see Table 2). If a
compensation of 85 percent
5 and more is considered an appropriate cutoff
point, there were 11 such countries. There was another group of countries in
which only a fraction of the 1960 deficit at young ages was compensated in
the second part of their reproductive period. There were 7 such cases. In yet
other countries fertility was lower throughout the reproductive life span of the
1960 cohort compared to the 1950 one. There were 7 countries of this type.
Finally, there were 2 countries in which fertility was higher among young
women and lower among older ones in the 1960 compared to the 1950
cohort.
2. The trend of a decline in fertility of young women among the
cohorts born during the 1960s has continued (see Table 3). Comparing
CCFRs up to age 26 in the 1970 with the 1960 cohorts, in almost all countries
young women incurred a deficit of around 20 percent or more.
3. The trend of a decline in fertility of the youngest among young
women in the cohorts born during the early to mid-1970s has continued (see
Table 4). Comparing CCFRs up to age 21 in the 1975 with the 1970 cohorts,
considering the span between the cohorts is only 5 years, in almost all
countries the fertility decline was of a similar magnitude if not steeper as when
observing the cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s.
B. An evaluation of the facts
The evaluation will be conducted taking as a basis the requirements
of the formal demography and the social demography definitions of
postponement of births (see section “Second methodological note:
postponement”).
1. In the 11 countries in which the fertility deficits when young were
compensated for later in reproductive life, the childbearing age patterns of the
1960 cohorts meet the requirements of both the formal and the social
                                                          
4 The dividing point = completed age 26.
5 This appears to capture the spirit of the Hajnal’s formal demography definition of postponement, i.e.
“…. so that the size of the family remains relatively constant.”13
demography definitions of postponement. In the 16 other countries the
requirements of the formal demography definition are not met, i. e.
postponement was not taking place, because the fertility decline early in the
reproductive period was not compensated for by a surplus later when these
women were older.
It can be assumed that some postponement of births was taking place
among women of the 1960 birth cohorts in the spirit of the social demography
definition. The lower fertility of the young women may have been at least in
part “due to a postponement of births regarded as temporary by the couples
involved." To what extent this is so, is a subject matter for other -- say,
sociological, psychological or modern anthropological -- research, but cannot
be explored with the information available in this project.
2. The analysis in the above section “What is known about future
cohort age trajectories?” dealt with women born towards the end of the 1960s,
represented by the 1970 birth cohorts. Before discussing the results of the
analysis, the qualification has to be made that the future is unknown.
Nevertheless, the analysis made a convincing argument that in a number of
countries, especially the formerly socialist ones which had an age pattern
concentrated early in the reproductive period, it would be impossible for
formal demographic postponement to occur. Even in most Western countries
it appears unlikely for formal demographic postponement to take place. The
analysis demonstrated that it might be feasible in some countries for fertility of
the 1970 cohort to catch up with the 1960 TCFRs. Note however, that the
majority of these were already considerably below replacement. Formal
demographic postponement and catching up to the replacement level appears
unrealistic in almost all low-fertility countries for the 1970 cohorts.
What was said above about how couples or women viewed their
fertility decisions when they were young, the social demographic type of
postponement, applies also to the 1970 cohort. This project is not equipped to
provide such insights.
3. The amount of information that is available for the cohorts born
around 1975 is too limited to allow any analysis of postponement of births.
Nevertheless, the knowledge that in almost all countries fertility of the 1975
cohorts was significantly lower than that of the 1970 ones is very important for
the following reason. It will be an even greater challenge for the 1975 cohorts
to attain fertility surpluses later in their reproductive periods to compensate for
the deficits they were incurring when young, because the youngest of the
young in the 1975 cohorts are having less children than any previous cohorts.14
Overall conclusions
1. Irrespective of trends in the TCFRs, the age patterns of cohort fertility are
continuously changing in all low fertility countries.
2. The answer to the question posed in the subtitle of the paper is a qualified
“yes.” The postponement of births is an inherent element of childbearing
age trajectories in the late 20
th century. However, the postponement of
childbearing in the formal demographic sense applies only some of the
times in some countries. In the social demographic sense the
postponement of births is probably taking place in all countries most of the
time. This appears as an eminently plausible hypothesis, however, it cannot
be explored with the data analyzed in this paper, but has to be confirmed or
refuted by the help of other social science research.
3. The analysis in this paper supports and strengthens conclusions reached in
an earlier paper by the authors (Frejka, Calot 2001):
a. There was a distinct difference between cohort fertility patterns in the
formerly socialist countries and those of the "Western" countries.
b. Cohorts born during the 1960s and early 1970s in the low-fertility
countries are likely to have lower completed fertility than previous cohorts and
this is going to be considerably below replacement; and
c. In most countries it appears likely that only a fraction of the shortfall
in fertility being incurred by the young women of the cohorts born during the
1960s and early to mid-1970s will be made up when these women will be
older.
In sum, in almost all low-fertility countries each cohort of young women
born in the 1960s and 1970s is having fewer children than preceding ones.
Consequently, below replacement and possibly declining period fertility can
be expected in the low-fertility countries in the foreseeable future. In other
words, thus far it does not appear that an increase in fertility is likely in the
near future.
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Denmark 56.3           65.0           60.3           40.1           15 -7 -33
Finland 51.8           61.9           51.0           39.2           19 -18 -23
Norway 46.1           61.3           60.3           43.6           33 -2 -28
Sweden 52.2           59.3           52.5           39.2           14 -11 -25
Belgium 43.9           57.5           56.5           45.0           31 -2 -20
France 48.4           56.2           55.6           45.9           16 -1 -17
England & Wales 47.4           62.5           56.1           46.8           32 -10 -17
Netherlands 31.3           48.2           48.4           30.6           54 0 -37
Austria 44.1           60.1           62.0           53.3           36 3 -14
Switzerland 36.4           51.8           47.9           35.3           42 -8 -26
Former FRG 43.0           57.0           55.5           41.5           33 -3 -25
Former GDR n.a. 68.1           70.0           74.0           n.a. 3 6
Bulgaria 69.2           73.4           77.9           81.0           6 6 4
Czech Republic 68.9           71.1           73.8           74.6           3 4 1
Hungary 65.7           62.7           68.5           65.3           -5 9 -5
Romania n.a. 56.3           69.4           75.0           n.a. 23 8
Russian Fed. n.a. 59.1           62.3           71.8           n.a. 5 15
Slovak Republic 60.3           66.8           69.2           72.0           11 4 4
FR Yugoslavia n.a. 62.5           64.0           62.6           n.a. 2 -2
Estonia n.a. 54.6 62.1 69.9 n.a. 14 13
Latvia n.a. 53.2 61.2 68.8 n.a. 15 12
Lithuania n.a. 51.9a 59.9 65.5 n.a. 15 9
Greece n.a. n.a. 61.1           61.9           n.a. n.a. 1
Italy 39.0           48.6           55.9           46.2           25 15 -17
Portugal 39.7           48.6           57.3           56.4           22 18 -2
Spain n.a. n.a. 51.8           46.1           n.a. n.a. -11
Australia 51.3           60.6           57.9           43.4           18 -4 -25
Japan 51.8           47.5           48.4           37.2           -8 2 -23
New Zealand 49.1           63.8           64.2           46.7           30 1 -27
USA 59.9           71.2           59.8           52.6           19 -16 -12









The proportion of childbearing realized by completed age 26, selected countries, birth cohorts 1930-31, 
1940-41, 1950-51 and 1960-61
Northern Europe
Proportion of childbearing of birth cohort 
by completed  age 26
Relative change of proportions 





Denmark 1.143 0.761 -0.382 0.754 1.135 0.381 100                       
Finland 0.946 0.761 -0.185 0.907 1.180 0.273 148                       
Norway 1.258 0.908 -0.350 0.828 1.177 0.349 100                       
Sweden 1.052 0.793 -0.259 0.953 1.230 0.277 107                       
 Western Europe
Belgium 1.028 0.822 -0.206 0.792 1.003 0.211 102                       
France 1.174 0.962 -0.212 0.935 1.132 0.197 93                         
England & Wales 1.151 0.911 -0.240 0.901 1.034 0.133 55                         
Netherlands 0.914 0.563 -0.351 0.975 1.276 0.301 86                         
Central Europe
Austria 1.136 0.885 -0.251 0.696 0.777 0.081 32                         
Switzerland 0.860 0.624 -0.236 0.934 1.144 0.210 89                         
Former FRG 0.940 0.662 -0.278 0.753 0.932 0.179 64                         
Former GDR 1.255 1.326 0.071 0.538 0.465 -0.073 reversed
Formerly socialist countries (Central and Eastern Europe)
Bulgaria 1.590 1.528 -0.062 0.450 0.359 -0.091 fertdecl >&<27
Czech Republic 1.547 1.502 -0.045 0.550 0.510 -0.040 fertdecl >&<27
Hungary 1.336 1.317 -0.019 0.615 0.701 0.086 453                       
Romania 1.669 1.591 -0.078 0.735 0.531 -0.204 fertdecl >&<27
Russian Fed. 1.166 1.307 0.141 0.707 0.514 -0.193 reversed
Slovak Republic 1.592 1.562 -0.030 0.708 0.606 -0.102 fertdecl >&<27
FR Yugoslavia 1.447 1.416 -0.031 0.813 0.846 0.033 106                       
Estonia 1.205       1.376       0.171 0.736       0.592       -0.144 reversed
Latvia 1.144       1.295       0.151 0.725       0.587       -0.138 reversed
Lithuania 1.201       1.210       0.009 0.804       0.638       -0.166 reversed
Greece 1.264 1.184 -0.080 0.805 0.728 -0.077 fertdecl >&<27
Italy 1.037 0.744 -0.293 0.819 0.868 0.049 17                         
Portugal 1.183 1.057 -0.126 0.881 0.815 -0.066 fertdecl >&<27
Spain 1.086 0.783 -0.303 1.009 0.916 -0.093 fertdecl >&<27
Non-European countries
Australia 1.349 0.918 -0.431 0.982 1.198 0.216 50                         
Japan 0.977 0.668 -0.309 1.044 1.126 0.082 27                         
New Zealand 1.635 1.091 -0.544 0.911 1.246 0.335 62                         
USA 1.201 1.057 -0.144 0.814 0.960 0.146 101                       
Cumulated cohort fertility rates (CCFRs), by completed age 26 and after age 26, selected countries, birth 






fertility after age 
26
CCFR of birth cohort at 
completed age 26











Denmark 1.143    0.761    0.600    -33 -21 -48 -0.38 -0.16 -0.54
Finland 0.946    0.761    0.638    -20 -16 -33 -0.19 -0.12 -0.31
Norway 1.258    0.908    0.743    -28 -18 -41 -0.35 -0.17 -0.52
Sweden 1.052    0.793    0.665    -25 -16 -37 -0.26 -0.13 -0.39
 Western Europe
Belgium 1.028    0.822    0.572a -20 -30 -44 -0.21 -0.25 -0.46
France 1.174    0.962    0.597    -18 -38 -49 -0.21 -0.36 -0.58
England & Wales 1.151    0.911    0.755    -21 -17 -34 -0.24 -0.16 -0.40
Netherlands 0.914    0.563    0.352    -38 -38 -62 -0.35 -0.21 -0.56
Central Europe
Austria 1.136    0.885    0.666    -22 -25 -41 -0.25 -0.22 -0.47
Switzerland 0.860    0.624    0.427    -27 -32 -50 -0.24 -0.20 -0.43
Former FRG 0.940    0.662    0.478    -30 -28 -49 -0.28 -0.18 -0.46
Former GDR 1.255    1.326    0.668    6 -50 -47 0.07 -0.66 -0.59
Bulgaria 1.590    1.528    1.167    -4 -24 -27 -0.06 -0.36 -0.42
Czech Republic 1.547    1.502    1.160    -3 -23 -25 -0.04 -0.34 -0.39
Hungary 1.336    1.317    1.054    -1 -20 -21 -0.02 -0.26 -0.28
Romania 1.669    1.591    1.097    -5 -31 -34 -0.08 -0.49 -0.57
Russian Fed. 1.166    1.307    1.062    12 -19 -9 0.14 -0.25 -0.10
Slovak Republic 1.592    1.562    1.151    -2 -26 -28 -0.03 -0.41 -0.44
FR Yugoslavia 1.447    1.416    1.139a -2 -20 -21 -0.03 -0.28 -0.31
Estonia 1.205    1.376    1.038    14 -25 -14 0.17 -0.34 -0.17
Latvia 1.144    1.295    0.986    13 -24 -14 0.15 -0.31 -0.16
Lithuania 1.201    1.210    1.081    1 -11 -10 0.01 -0.13 -0.12
Southern Europe
Greece 1.264    1.183    0.644    n.a. -46 n.a. n.a. -0.54 n.a.
Italy 1.037    0.744    0.257    -28 -65 -75 -0.29 -0.49 -0.78
Portugal 1.183    1.057    0.678    -11 -36 -43 -0.13 -0.38 -0.51
Spain 1.086    0.783    0.294    -28 -62 -73 -0.30 -0.49 -0.79
Non-European countries
Australia 1.349    0.918    0.646    -32 -30 -52 -0.43 -0.27 -0.70
Japan 0.977    0.668    0.410    -32 -39 -58 -0.31 -0.26 -0.57
New Zealand 1.635    1.091    1.007    -33 -8 -38 -0.54 -0.08 -0.63
USA 1.201    1.057    1.072    -12 1 -11 -0.14 0.02 -0.13
Cumulated cohort fertility rates (CCFRs) by completed age 26, selected countries, birth cohorts 1950-51,
1960-61 and 1970-71
a






Difference of CCFRs 
between birth cohorts (in 
children per woman)
Baltic countries
Formerly socialist countries (Central and Eastern Europe)
CCFR of birth cohort 






Difference of CCFRs 






Denmark 59.9              1.90             0.600            68              71              14            19             
Finland 60.8              1.94             0.638            67              70              10            15             
Norway 56.4              2.09             0.743            64              65              14            15             
Sweden 60.8              2.02             0.665            67              68              10            12             
 Western Europe
Belgium 55.0              1.83             0.572a 69              73              25            32             
France 54.1              2.09             0.597            71              72              32            32             
England & Wales 53.2              1.94             0.755            61              64              15            20             
Netherlands 69.4              1.84             0.352            81              83              17            20             
Central Europe
Austria 46.7              1.66             0.666            60              68              28            46             
Switzerland 64.7              1.77             0.427            76              80              17            23             
Former FRG 58.5              1.59             0.478            70              77              20            32             
Former GDR 26.0              1.79             0.668            63              68              141          162           
Bulgaria 19.0              1.90             1.167            39              44              103          134           
Czech Republic 25.4              2.01             1.160            42              45              66            76             
Hungary 34.7              2.02             1.054            48              50              38            44             
Romania 25.0              2.12             1.097            48              48              93            91             
Russian Fed. 28.2              1.82             1.062            42              49              48            75             
Slovak Republic 28.0              2.17             1.151            47              45              68            61             
FR Yugoslavia 37.4              2.26             1.139a 50              46              33            22             
Estonia 30.1              1.97             1.038            47              51              57            68             
Latvia 31.2              1.88             0.986            48              53              53            70             
Lithuania 34.5              1.85             1.081            41              49              20            41             
Greece 38.1              1.91             0.664            65              68              71            79             
Italy 53.8              1.61             0.318            80              85              49            58             
Portugal 43.6              1.87             0.678            64              68              46            55             
Spain 55.9              1.70             0.294            83              86              48            54             
Non-European countries
Australia 56.6              2.12             0.646            70              69              23            22             
Japan 62.8              1.79             0.410            77              80              23            28             
New Zealand 53.3              2.34             0.751            68              64              27            21             
USA 47.4 2.02             1.072            47              49              -1 3               



















a Estimate based on CCFR completed age 25 multiplied by ratio CCFR26/CCFR25 of previous cohort
Childbearing needed after age 26 for 1970-71 cohort to attain total cohort fertility rate of 1960-61 cohort or 
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Figure 2a. Age-specific fertility rates, recorded and assumed, Denmark, birth cohorts,








































Figure 2b. Age-specific fertility rates, recorded and estimated, Denmark and Switzerland,


















































































Figure 3b. Age-specific fertility rates, recorded and estimated, Bulgaria and Switzerland, 1930, 1960-


















































Denmark 0.403         0.224         0.132         0.120         -9 -41 -44
Finland 0.352         0.236         0.162         0.140         -14 -31 -33
Norway 0.515         0.307         0.216         0.174         -19 -30 -40
Sweden 0.387         0.220         0.189         0.118         -38 -14 -43
 Western Europe
Belgium 0.327         0.228         0.121         0.100a -17 -47 -30
France 0.386         0.270         0.136         0.106         -22 -50 -30
England & Wales 0.494         0.326         0.300         0.285         -5 -8 -34
Netherlands 0.229         0.106         0.075         0.067         -11 -29 -54
Central Europe
Austria 0.532         0.340         0.198         0.182         -8 -42 -36
Switzerland 0.245         0.125         0.080         0.073         -9 -36 -49
Former FRG 0.396         0.206         0.133         0.140         5 -35 -48
Former GDR 0.590         0.532         0.300         0.121         -60 -44 -10
Bulgaria 0.746         0.805         0.685         0.389         -43 -15 8
Czech Republic 0.600         0.694         0.585         0.294         -50 -16 16
Hungary 0.509         0.585         0.413         0.274         -34 -29 15
Romania 0.745         0.734         0.554         0.415         -25 -25 -1
Russian Fed. 0.453         0.532         0.582         0.453         -22 9 17
Slovak Republic 0.578         0.644         0.606         0.284         -53 -6 11
FR Yugoslavia 0.654         0.579         0.474         0.377a -20 -18 -11
Estonia 0.447         0.557         0.540         0.344         -36 -3 24
Latvia 0.410         0.489         0.518         0.327         -37 6 19
Lithuania 0.403         0.385         0.504         0.404         -20 31 -4
Southern Europe
Greece n.a. 0.547         0.237         0.153         -35 -57 n.a.
Italy 0.324         0.261         0.109         0.077         -29 -58 -19
Portugal 0.366         0.456         0.260         0.202         -22 -43 25
Spain 0.189         0.278         0.127         0.076         -40 -54 47
Non-European countries
Australia 0.533         0.298         0.213         0.199         -7 -29 -44
Japan 0.111         0.079         0.066         0.062         -6 -16 -29
New Zealand 0.323         0.223         0.166         0.157         -5 -26 -31
USA 0.600         0.491         0.513         0.528         3 4 -18
Cumulated cohort fertility rates (CCFRs), completed age 21, selected countries, birth cohorts 
1950-51, 1960-61, 1970-71 and 1975-76
Country
Formerly socialist countries (Central and Eastern Europe)
Note: 
a Estimate based on CCFR completed age 20 multiplied by ratio CCFR21/CCFR20 of previous 
cohort
CCFR of birth cohort by completed age 21 Difference of CCFRs between 
birth cohorts (in percent)
Baltic countries